Introduction
French governments have, since the start of discussions on the shape of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1988, been the principal proponents of the establishment of some form of 'gouvernement économique', economic governance (EG) at European Union (EU) level. This French preoccupation reflects concerns linked to the traditionally widespread reluctance to accept central bank independence, opposition to the 'sound money' bias of the EMU project, and the French tradition of state intervention in the economy. EG has been seen as a means of counterbalancing the monetary policy-making power of the European Central Bank (ECB) in EMU, qualifying the 'sound money' bias of the bank and EMU fiscal policy rules, and encouraging coordinated reflation to ensure economic growth in the Eurozone.
EG and the EMU project more broadly can be seen as mechanisms through which French governments have sought to manage both European and international constraints, in this way using Europe to keep the world at bay. In the 1980s and early 1990s, key French policymakers turned to EMU as an option when German governments refused to reform the European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS was centred around the German mark, and created what the French saw as asymmetric adjustment pressures imposed principally upon weak (more inflationary) currency countries (Howarth, 2001) . If French governments wanted to keep the franc in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, they were required to lower French inflation and control public expenditure. They were also required to maintain interest rates above those in Germany -given the anchor role of the German mark -whether or not these rates were appropriate for the French economy. In the early 127 1990s, the operation of the ERM resulted in record high real interest rate levels, contributing to sluggish economic growth. While French governments wanted exchange rate stability in Western Europe, they did not fully accept the economic constraint imposed upon them to achieve that stability.
International developments stimulated initial French interest in European monetary integration. In the 1960s and 1970s, President de Gaulle and his successors criticised what they saw as US monetary policy irresponsibility (Maclean, 2002: 77) . With the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s and the rise in speculative capital flows, the French turned to European monetary cooperation for exchange rate stability. In the 1980s and 1990s, EMU was seen by some French policy-makers (Howarth, 2001) as a mechanism to eliminate speculative pressures against the franc once and for all, significantly reducing international financial pressures for adjustment. For many in France, a single European currency was also seen as a potential rival to the US dollar as the most used international currency, a status which would provide European economies with similar advantages enjoyed by the US (Howarth, 2001) .
EMU has represented a paradox for French policy-makers. The loss of monetary policy, the creation of an ECB hawkish on inflation, and the fiscal policy rules of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have suggested constraint. Many have concluded that EMU would reinforce the liberalising pressures created by European and international market integration, and thus the need to push through domestic structural reforms. At the same time, EMU involves a form of protection for the French economy (and, indeed, for most West European economies), sheltering it from the speculative attacks that previously reinforced adjustment pressures. French policy on EU-level economic governance has, since the late 1980s, reflected an effort to manipulate the constraint-shelter paradox of EMU with the aim of loosening the constraint. EMU is to be a shelter in the flux of international capital flows. EMU is not to be inconveniently constraining. The term 'economic governance' can signify several different things. In general terms, EG is an institutional set-up at the European level designed to establish some form of macroeconomic policy, be it only 'soft', non-binding economic policy coordination, that has direct impact upon the member states. This is a form of collective governance (Wallace, 2000: 541ff.) 'among core actors from several institutions and bodies in a multi-faceted network which is constituted by mutual participation patterns ' (Wessels and Linsenmann, 2002 
